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Abstract
This Note examines the extent to which the corporate mismanagement sphere of Rule 10b-5
may be applied extraterritorially to the internal regulation of offshore investment funds. Part I
analyzes the policies behind the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction under international law
and illustrates that the jurisdictional policies prescribed by international law do not support such
an expansionist view of the Securities Exchange Act of 193415 (’34 Act). Part II focuses on the
Congressional intent behind the ‘34 Act and addresses the issue whether the ’34 Act was to have
extraterritorial application and to be a vehicle for the regulation of offshore investment funds. Part
III discusses and analyzes the application of Rule 10b-5 to the regulation of offshore investment
funds and examines cases involving extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5.

OFFSHORE FUNDS AND RULE lOb-5: AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACH TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
UNDER THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
INTRODUCTION
As foreign investment in United States securities rose
from $25.6 billion in 19711 to $74 billion in 1981,2 offshore
investment funds 3 provided a large number of foreign investors with a vehicle for diversified portfolio investment in
United States securities.4 Offshore funds proved a particularly
popular vehicle for foreign investment in United States securities for two reasons. They enjoy freedom from Securities and
Exchange Commission 5 (SEC or Commission) regulation, 6 and
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 21 (Aug. 1973).
DEP'T OF COM., SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 56 (Aug. 1981).

2. U.S.

3. "An offshore fund is defined as a mutual fund, hedge fund, leverage fund,
investment company or combination thereof that (a) is incorporated in a foreign
country . . . (b) does all or most or a principal part of its selling to persons who are
not U.S. citizens or residents, and (c) whose principal sales efforts are not aimed
primarily at residents of [the incorporating nation]." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, Part 3, 92d
Cong., lst Sess. 879 n.1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
STUDY]. For a general discussion of offshore funds, see 4 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 329-33 (1980); see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND OFFSHORE FUNDS (1969) (discussing generally offshore in-

vestment funds).
4. See SEC INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 3, at 879, 920-41, 949;
Hart, Use of Tax Treaties and Offshore Investment Vehicles for Foreign Investors in 6 N.Y.U.
INT'L INST. ON TAX AND BUs. PLAN., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 125, 148-49 (N. Liakas ed. 1978).

5. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is a federal
agency created by Congress through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d (1982 & Supp. 1985) ('34 Act). The Commission administers the Securities
Act of 1933, id. §8 77a, s, t, u, the '34 Act, id. § 78d, and various other acts, all of
which are listed in 17 C.F.R. § 200.2 (1984).
As an administrative agency, the Commission promulgates rules to implement
the acts which it administers. Congress specifically gave the Commission power to
promulgate rules under § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982 & Supp. 1985), by providing
that "it shall be unlawful ...

[to engage in specific conduct]

. . .

in contravention of

such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate .... ." Id. § 78j(b). Furthermore, the '34 Act gives the Commission broad
powers to promulgate rules as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.
See id. § 78w(a). A "rule" has been defined as "the product ... of the administrative
process that resembles a legislature's enactment of a statute." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 5.01, at 123 (3d ed. 1972). The Administrative Procedure Act, 5
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they receive favorable tax advantages by incorporating in hospitable tax forums such as the Bahamas, Bermuda., Luxembourg, and the Netherlands Antilles.7 Although a burgeoning
business in offshore funds exposes the United States :securities
markets to some potential harm,8 the real potential tor abuse
lies in the internal corporate and financial structure of the offshore investment fund itself. It is this aspect of offshore funds
that is considered beyond the regulation of the United States.9
U.S.C. § 500 (1982 & Supp. 1985), distinguishes between substantive or legislative
rules and interpretative rules. Id. § 553. It has been suggested that a substantive
rule is one "issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and which implement[s] the statute, as for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission." K. DAvis, supra, § 5.03 at 126 (citing 1947 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA at 30). Rule lOb-5 fits this definition. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1984).
6. SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 3, at 881-82, 949; Pursuant to
Rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1984), any foreign private issuers with fewer
than 300 holders resident in the United States are exempt from registration under
§ 12(g) of the '34 Act. Therefore, the provisions of the '34 Act relating to a fund
trading in its own stock are, under the rule, inapplicable to offshore funds. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g3-2. The rule provides that "(a) securities of any class issued by any foreign private issuer shall be exempt from section 12(g) of the Act if the class has fewer
than 300 holders resident in the United States." Id. § 240.12g3-2(a).
7. See SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 3, at 904-912, 949; 4 T.
FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 329-33; Hart, supra note 4, at 147. It is pointed out that:
Offshore funds offer what American investment companies cannot offer: investment in United States securities without the liability for United States
estate tax. . . . Because these funds are not regulated or taxed, their managers have more flexibility to adopt effective investment policies. The foreign investor pays no tax in his own country on dividends and interest
credited to his participations in the fund until he sells his participations;
neither does the foreign investor pay United States tax on his income.
T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 329-30; Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARV. L. REV. 404, 404-22 (1969). For a current discussion of
the possible erosion of these tax advantages, see also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
FOREIGN TAX PLANNING 1983 at 189-285 (discussing the elements involved in the
taxation of offshore investment companies).
8. SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 3, at 945-47, 951. The SEC
noted that potential abuses might include: 1) foreign funds being used to acquire
specific United States companies in violation of United States laws and national interests; 2) large sales in an offshore fund of a United States security could have some
effect on market stability and prove harmful to the individual security in question;
and 3) foreign investor confidence in offshore funds might be impaired, thus creating
apprehension in foreigners. Id.; see also Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to
a Regulatory Dilemma, 3 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 157, 165 n.38 (1971).
9. The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -64 (1982 &
Supp. 1985), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id. §§ 80b-1 to -21, regulate
only those companies that register under them, id. §§ 80a-7, -8, or use the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to sell securities. Id. §§ 80b-4, -6; see id. : 80a-7(d). A
foreign investment company is not entitled to register of right, but § 7(d) of the In-
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In recent years, however, United States courts have tried to
extend Rule lOb-5' 0 extraterritorially in order to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in actions involving offshore investment funds. "
vestment Company Act (ICA) authorizes the SEC, upon application by a foreign investment company, to issue an order permitting such company to register if enforcement of the provisions of the ICA against such company is feasible and the interests
of United States investors are protected. Id. § 80a-7(d).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984) (promulgated under the '34 Act, § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1982 & Supp. 1985)). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.

11. Although the cases listed below do not all involve offshore investment funds
per se, they deal with extraterritorial extensions of Rule lOb-5 to situations involving
foreign investment vehicles similar to offshore funds. These cases point out that
United States interests predominate in decisions to exercise or decline jurisdiction.
The courts make little mention of the broader interests of the international community. See, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 423-26 (9th Cir. 1983); IIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 919-21 (2d Cir. 1980); Fidenas A.G. v. Compagnie Int'l, 606
F.2d 5, 8-10 (2d Cir. 1979); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 414-17 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 28384 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985-87 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1004-12 (2d Cir. 1975);
SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356-58 (9th Cir. 1973); Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330-39 (2d Cir. 1972);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 206-08 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respect to holding
on merits, 405 F.2d 215, 216-23 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969); Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 975 (1969). The Supreme Court expressed a similar opinion in a related
context in the Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971). The Court
stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged
if. . . we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts. .

.

. We cannot have trade and commerce

in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Id.; see also Loomis & Grant, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, FinancialInstitutions Outside the U.S. and ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Securities Laws, I J. COMp.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 3, 24 n.l (1978). The issue that needs to be addressed here is

whether United State's courts have applied securities laws and regulations that have
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Although Rule lOb-5 is usually thought of as a device to
protect investors by proscribing nondisclosure of material information or distribution of materially misleading information, 12 it also operates to protect the corporation in its securities dealings.' 3 This range of activities is normally labeled "internal corporate mismanagement."1 4

This Note examines the extent to which the corporate miseffectively controlled domestic transactions too rigidly in an international context.
Former SEC Commissioner Barbara Thomas admits that this is a real concern and
acknowledges that "there will be much greater need in this decade, and beyond, to
recognize the interests of other nations, and to factor notions of comity and foreign
sovereignty into the governance of transactions that traverse national borders."
Thomas, Extraterritorialityin an Era of Internationalization of the Securities Markets: The
Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 453, 454 (1983); see also Thomas,
Internationalizationof the World's Capital Markets-Can the SEC Help Shape the Future?, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
IN 1982 at 83-97; Comments Sought on MultinationalSecurities Offerings, SEC Today, (Mar.

1, 1985) (reporting that the SEC is soliciting comments on two approaches designed

to harmonize disclosure and distribution practices for multinational offerings. The
SEC is also soliciting public comments on a series of specific questions dealing with
these approaches and the SEC's role in facilitating multinational offerings).
Issues dealing with transnational securities fraud have been analyzed in a
number of legal publications. See, e.g., Beard, InternationalSecurities Regulation-Absorption of the Shock, 10 INT'L LAW. 635 (1976); Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of
Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1969); Johnson, Application of FederalSecurities Law to International Securities Transactions, in 1980 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, FINANCING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 57 (B. Hawk ed.); Karmel, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Federal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REV. 669 (1975); Mizrack, Recent Developments in the ExtraterritorialApplication of Section 10(b) of the SecIrities Exchange
Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367 (1975); Norton, ExtraternitorialJurisdictionof U.S. Antitrust
and Securities Laws, 28 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 575 (1979); Thomas, supra, at 454; Note,
Offshore Mutual Funds: ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1225 (1972); Note, ExtraterritorialApplicatiorof the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (1969); Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1978); Note,
Regulation of Offshore Investment Companies Through ExtraterritorialApplication of Rule lOb5, 1982 DUKE L.J. 167; Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 89
HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, The InternationalCharacterof Securities Credit: A Regulatory Problem, 2 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 147, 155-64 (1970); Comment, Securities LawSubject MatterJurisdictionin TransnationalSecurities Fraud-Berschv. Drexel Firestone, Inc.IITv. Vencap, Ltd., 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 113 (1976); Note, Extra TerritorialApplication of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 342 (1973); Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005
(1976); Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule l0b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363
(1973); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the FederalSecurities Code: An Examination of the
Role of InternationalLaw in American Courts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1978).

12. See infra notes 148-67 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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management sphere of Rule lOb-5 may be applied extraterritorially to the internal regulation of offshore investment funds.
Part I analyzes the policies behind the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction under international law and illustrates that the
jurisdictional policies prescribed by international law do not

support such an expansionist view of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193415 ('34 Act). Part II focuses on the Congressional
intent behind the '34 Act and addresses the issue whether the
'34 Act was to have extraterritorial application and to be a vehicle for the regulation of offshore investment funds. Part III
discusses and analyzes the application of Rule lOb-5 to the
regulation of offshore investment funds and examines cases involving extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
EXTRA TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
RULE 10b-5
A. Doctrine of Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw
International law has yet to define all forms ofjurisdiction
that may be exercised by "international legal persons and
states. '" 6 It has arrived, however, at a definition of the juris15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1982 & Supp. 1985).
16. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw 168, 421 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN]. The
term international legal person is defined by Henkin as follows:
A subject of international law is considered to be an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties and endowed with the capacity to
take certain types of action on the international plane. The terms "international legal person" or "legal personality" are commonly used in referring
to such entities. Questions of whether an entity is an international legal
person arise in various contexts. Most commonly, they have related to the
capacity to make treaties and agreements under internatonal law, the capacity to make claims for breaches of international law, and the enjoyment of
privileges and immunities from national jurisdiction. The question of international legal personality may also arise in regard to membership or participation in international bodies.
States are, of course, the principal examples of international persons.
The attributes of statehood, as developed in customary law, provided the
criteria for determining the "personality" of other entities. Indeed, under
the traditional view only fully sovereign states could be persons in international law. The realities were more complex and many different kinds of
entities have been considered as capable of having international rights and
duties and the capacity to act on the international plane.
The widening of the concept of international legal personality beyond
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diction of states." v Under international law, jurisdiction refers
to a state's right to exercise certain powers to regulate matters
not exclusively of domestic concern.' 8 This "exercise of
power" in an international context is entirely distinct from the
existence of internal power, constitutional capacity, or sovereignty.' 9 The fact that a state has power under municipal law
the state is one of the more significant features of contemporary international law.
Id. at 168.
17. See 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw 279 (1970). Lauterpacht describes the difference between states and individuals under international law by stating that international law is a law of states exclusively. Id. Lauterpacht writes that
individuals are only the objects of international law and as such international law
does not impose duties upon them; neither does it grant to them directly any rights.
Id. Lauterpacht argues that "such internationally relevant rights as they possess are
granted by municipal law in accordance with international law. It is obviously a theory which sees in the sovereign State the ultimate unit and maker of international
law, with all the consequences attaching thereto." Id.; see Mann, The Doctrine ofJurisdiction in International Law, in I RECUEIL

DES

COURS, ACADIMIE DE DFIOIT INTERNA-

TIONAL 9, 9-15 (1964). "The problem of international jurisdiction relates to the activities of a State, though it can arise in the case of an international organi sation which,
by the treaty creating it, usually is empowered to act within a limited sphere and
which, by exceeding it, would be acting ultra vires." Id. at 9. International jurisdiction has been described as one of the fundamental functions of public international
law. Id. at 15. In other words, "the function of regulating and delimiting the respective competences of States, 'de confrer, de repartir et de r~glementer des comp6tences.' The same idea is expressed, when in German reference is made to the 'Geltungsbereich' of laws, or the 'Gesetzgebungsgewalt' of States." Id. at 15 (footnote
omitted).
The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, has defined a state in the following manner: "The
State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity
to enter into relations with the other States. Id. art. 1. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
the SECOND RESTATEMENT] has also defined "state."

Section 4 provides: "Except as

otherwise indicated, 'state,' . . . means an entity that has a defined territory and population under the control of a government and that engages in foreign relations." Id.
18. Mann, supra note 17, at 9.
19. Id. at 9-17. "There is, of course, no doubt that, as a matter of international
law, a State is free to legislate in whatever manner and for whatever purpose it
chooses. But like all other attributes of sovereignty this liberty is subject to the overriding question of entitlement." Id. at 9. But the mere fact that a state has the power
under municipal law to do a particular act does not imply that international law will
recognize the same. Id. "The existence of the State's right to exercise jurisdiction is
exclusively determined by public internationallaw." Id. at 10-11. In circumstances involving international jurisdiction, international law limits jurisdiction which would
have been granted to the state alone. Id. at 9-22. " 'U]urisdiction which, in principle,
belongs solely to the State, is limited by the rule of international law.' No theory of
sovereignty can displace them. . . . Were this not so, it would be possible, in the
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to do a particular act does not imply that it has this power
under international law.2 °
Under international law, the jurisdiction of a state depends upon its interests in exercising jurisdiction when viewed
in light of the competing interests of other states. 2 ' These
competing interests, which determine who will exercise jurisdiction, balance the transaction or event in question, and the
person to be affected, with the state's interests.2 2
The international law criteria for determining jurisdiction
of a state are: territory, nationality, and the protection of certain state and universal interests. 2 3 Whatever happens within a
name of sovereignty, to impose measures which are outside the State's jurisdiction.
This would be an intolerable result." Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. The main difference between international law and municipal law lies in
the fact that they regulate different subject'matter. International law is the law between sovereign states while municipal law applies within a state and controls the
relations of its citizens with each other and with the executive. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-34 (3d ed. 1979). For a discussion of the
relation between international law and municipal law, see L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at

114-167. Henkin states this distinction as follows:
There have developed two principal "schools" or approaches seeking to explain in terms of traditional legal analysis the relation of international law to
municipal law: the dualist (or pluralist) and the monist. There are several
versions of both approaches, but in simplest terms the dualists regard international law and municipal law as entirely separate legal systems which operate on different levels. They hold that international law can be applied by
municipal courts only when it has been "transformed" or "incorporated"
into municipal law, and emphasize the international legal personality of
states rather than individuals or other entities. The monists, on the other
hand, regard international law and municipal law as parts of a single legal
system, and find iteasier to maintain that individuals have international
legal personality. In a prevalent version of monism, municipal law is seen as
ultimately deriving its validity from international law, which stands "higher"
in the hierarchy of legal norms.
Id. at 118 n.3.
21. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 421. This approach, which advocates the balancing of states' interests prior to their exercise ofjurisdiction in transnational cases,
is a particularly important part of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as the DRAFT
Application
RESTATEMENT]; see id. § § 402-403; see also Reese, Limitations on Extraterritorial
of Law, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 589 (1978) (discussing limitations on extraterritorial application of law imposed by public international law).
22. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 421. These relative state interests as advocated
by international law have been codified in the SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17,
§ 40; see infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
23. L. HENKIN, supra note 14, at 421-22. The international law criteria of territory, nationality, and protection of certain state and universal interests-the criteria
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state's territory is of fundamental concern to that state.2 4
Therefore, a state's jurisdiction over events or individuals
within its territory is absolute.2 5 A state also has a major interest in exercising jurisdiction over its own nationals.2 6 Thereevaluated when determining jurisdiction-are reflected in the SECOND
supra note 17, § 10. Section 10 provides:
The jurisdiction of a state is founded on the following bases:

RESTATEMENT,

(a) territory, ...
(b) nationality, ...
(c) protection of certain state interests not covered under (a) and (b),
• . . and
(d) protection of certain universal interests ....
Given the fact that each state is part of the world community, rules defining its jurisdiction must take due account of the needs of that community and, specifically, of the
need not to encroach unnecessarily on the interests of other members. This has been
a significant consideration in delimiting in different fashion the extraterritorial reach
of the various kinds ofjurisdiction. Id.
24. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 421.
25. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
In the classic expression of this principle, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
Thejurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by il:self. Any
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
Id. at 135. Later Justice Story writing for the Court in The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824), said: "The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its
own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to
control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction." Id.
Territoriality remains the cardinal principle of jurisdiction in international law and
has been adopted by the United States in cases involving extraterrii.orial reach of
domestic statutes. D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 164 (1970); see supra note 11 (listing such cases). For a brief history of the territorial character of legislation, see
Mann, supra note 17, at 24-28.
26. 48 CJ.S. InternationalLaw § 27 (1981). Jurisdiction over nationals in an international context is described in the following manner:
Generally, nationals abroad are subject to the laws of their government
wherever they may be, and, under some circumstances, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory. . . . A
state or nation is not debarred by any rule of international law governing the
conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries
when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed, and,
thus, a sovereignty has power to make laws regulating the conduct of its
subjects while beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and, while such
laws have no extraterritorial effect and hence cannot be enforced while the
subject remains abroad, they may be enforced on his return to is jurisdiction.
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fore, international law does not bar a state from governing the
conduct of its nationals in foreign countries or on the high
seas. 2 7 Finally, a state's interest in protecting itself against actions executed outside its territory that threaten its existence
and against certain universally condemned activities are also
weighed to determine international jurisdiction.2 8
Traditionally three types ofjurisdiction are distinguished:
executive, judicial, and legislative. 29 Although municipal law
defines these types of jurisdiction on several levels,"0 international law provides yet another basis of definition. InternaId.
Common law countries have traditionally declined jurisdiction based on nationality or on any principle other than territoriality. Akehurst,Jurisdictionin International

Law, 1972-1973 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 157-58, 163. "The territorial principle is
very deep-rooted in English-speaking countries, because originally the members of
the jury were supposed to decide cases on the basis of their own knowledge of the
facts, which meant that they could only try crimes committed in the place where they
lived ..
" Id. at 163.
27. Mann, supra note 17, at 50; see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at 303. Brownlie
describes the nationality principle as an aspect of sovereignty that may be used as a
basis for jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts. Id.
28. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 157-66. Beginning in the nineteenth century
continental countries began to claim jurisdiction over acts committed by aliens
abroad which threatened the State. Id. This principle is well-established although
the range of acts covered by it is the subject of controversy. The Harvard Research
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, articles 7 and 8 included the
following acts under this rubric: "crimes against the security, territorial integrity or
political independence of the State, and the counterfeiting of the seals, currency,
instruments of credit, stamps, passports or public documents issued by the State."
Id. at 158.
The universality principle of jurisdiction has been asserted against pirates for
centuries. Id. at 160. It proposes that states work together to punish acts that are
considered crimes in the state where they were committed and in the state claiming
jurisdiction. Id. at 160-66.
29. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 420-23; Akehurst, supra note 24, at 145, 212.
30. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 420. Henkin points out that under municipal
law the legislative, judicial, or enforcement powers of particular institutions are defined on more than one level. For instance, the legislative, judicial, and enforcement
powers of the federal branches of government are defined in the constitution, which
sets limits on federal and state governments' legislative, judicial, and enforcement
jurisdiction. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. X. Yet, under municipal law's conflict of
law rules these same three areas of jurisdiction are defined and limited in ways that
may vary from those prescribed by constitutional law. Thus, Henkin notes that
a court in the United States may deny recognition to a foreign judgment or
refuse to apply a foreign law, because, under its conflicts rules, the foreign
court or legislature sought to extend its jurisdiction too far; and it may do
so, even if recognition of what the foreign institution did would not run
afoul of constitutional limitations.
L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 420.
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tional law sets limits that states may not exceed in the exercise
of these three types of jurisdiction.3
1. Executive Jurisdiction
Executive jurisdiction is the power of one state I:o perform
acts in the territory of another state.3 2 As a general rule, a
state may not exercise its executive or enforcement jurisdiction
in the territory of another state without the permission or consent of that other state
Not every act by one si:ate in the
territory of another, however, violates international law. 3 4 An
act by one state violates international law only when the act
amounts to a "usurpation of the sovereign powers" of the local
state. 35 Acts by one state in the territory of another may usurp
the sovereign powers of the other state either because of the
nature of the acts involved or the purpose for which the act is
performed. 6
International law condemns an act by one state in the territory of another when that act, by its nature, could only be performed by the officials of the local state and not by private individuals.3 For example, because taxes may be collected only by
public officials and not by private individuals, the officials of
one state may not collect taxes in another state's territory. 8
An act by one state in the territory of another may amount
31. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 420. Henkin points out that whie these three
types of jurisdiction have already been defined on "several levels under municipal
law, international law provides still a different level. It defines the limits states and
other international legal persons may not exceed in exercising jurisdiciion. . . . But,
within the international system, rules of international law operate directly on the subjects of international law whose powers they delimit." Id.
32. Id. at 423; Akehurst, supra note 26, at 145. The SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra

note 17, § 6, deals with both judicial jurisdiction and executive jurisdiction under the
term "enforcement jurisdiction." Enforcement jurisdiction is defined as "the capacity of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law, whether its capacity be
exercised by the judicial or the executive branch . . . or by some other branch of
government." Id.
33. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 423.

34. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 145-46. For example, every representative of a
state who signs a contract in another state is not acting in derogation of international
law. Id. In addition, some breaches of local law do not necessarily violate international law. Id. Spying in peacetime, for example, is by no means contrary to international law, although it will probably be contrary to a state's local law. See id.
35. Id. at 146.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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to a usurpation of the latter state's sovereign power because of
the act's purpose. 9 For example, a state may not normally
enter the territory of another state for the purpose of enforcing its sovereign taxing powers in that territory.40 Entry is a
usurpation of the local state's sovereign powers, and this is
contrary to international law.
2. Judicial Jurisdiction
Judicial jurisdiction is defined as the power of a state's
courts to try cases involving a foreign element.4 ' No issue of
international law arises when an act occurs within a state involving only persons who are nationals, domiciliaries, or residents of that state. The problem of international judicial jurisdiction surfaces only when there is some genuine foreign element, as when a state's court tries to reach either persons of
foreign nationality or events that happen abroad.4 2
The territorial principle furnishes a basis for the state's exercise of judicial jurisdiction over foreign persons or transactions within the territory in question.43 The territorial principle holds that a state has the power to control conduct occurring within its borders.4 4 The principle is frequently invoked
to obtain jurisdiction in criminal actions. 4 5 This can be problematic because quite often a crime is committed partly in one
country and partly in another, as in the textbook case involving
a gun being fired across a frontier.4 6 In this instance, the state
must prove that a "constituent element" of the offense took
place in its territory" because, pursuant to the international
39. Id. at 147.
40. Id.
41. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 422; Akehurst, supra note 26, at 145.
42. Mann, supra note 17, at 14.
43. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 422.
44. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 152.
45. Id. This is true "even in continental countries, which also rely on the nationality principle to a far greater extent than common law countries, prosecutions based
on the territorial principle far outnumber prosecutions based on the nationality principle." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 152-53. This is the viewpoint adopted in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus"
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 5 (Judgment of Sept. 7). In this case, a
French steamship, the Lotus, collided on the high seas with a Turkish vessel. The
latter sank and eight Turkish crew members lost their lives. Id. at 12-13. When the
Lotus reached Constantinople, one of her French officers was arrested, prosecuted for
manslaughter and eventually convicted in accordance with Turkish law which pro-
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law principle of territoriality, a state should only be able to
claim judicial jurisdiction if an offense takes place totally or
partially in its territory.4 8 At times this rule has been stretched
considerably in order to claim judicial jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad that merely produce effects within
the territory of judicial jurisdiction.4 9
A state also has the right to base judicial jurisdiction on
crimes committed by its nationals abroad.50 Acknowledging a
genuine link between nationality and the state, an individual is
considered to have the nationality that a state confers upon
vided for the application of Turkish criminal law where a foreigner committed an
offense against a Turkish subject outside Turkey. Id. The court found in favor of
Turkey by invoking a fictitious locality of the offense: the French vessel's act could be
said to have had its "effect" on what may be deemed to be Turkish territory. Id. at
23. With respect to the general question of territoriality ofjurisdiction the majority
said:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on
some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend
the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this
is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far
from laying down a generalprohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property anrd acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.

This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety
of rules which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other States ....
In these circumstances, all that can be required of a State is that it should
not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction;
within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
48. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 152-53.
49. Id. at 153. "Some States . . . claim jurisdiction over offences committed
abroad which merely produce effects on their territory, even though those effects
were not a constituent element of the crime." Id.
The English Perjury Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 6. illustrates this approach. The
Act provides that perjury by a person testifying before British authorities in foreign
countries for the purposes of juridical proceedings in England shall be treated as if
the perjury was committed in England. Id. § 1(5). "[O]n similar facts, courts in Argentina and the United States have openly based jurisdiction on the doctrine of effects. Other (non-perjury) cases in the United States and Switzerland also talk in
terms of effects." Akehurst, supra note 26, at 153-54.
50. Id. at 156.
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him." Thus, a state has judicial jurisdiction to prevent its nationals from evading its laws by going abroad to commit acts
proscribed within its own borders.5 2
International law also recognizes a protective principle of
judicial jurisdiction over acts committed by aliens abroad that
threaten the state.5 3 This principle includes a range of acts
that threaten the security, integrity, and political freedom of a
state.5 4
3. Legislative Jurisdiction
Legislative jurisdiction is the power of a state to apply its
laws to cases involving a foreign element. 55 Legislative jurisdiction tries to determine whether and under what circumstances a state has a right of regulation.5 6 International law
does not limit the scope of a state's legislative jurisdiction in
civil matters, 57 but limits are imposed on a state's criminal legislative jurisdiction by requiring a proper jurisdictional basis.5 8
Once a proper basis for the exercise of jurisdiction is found, a
state's legislative reach extends beyond its boundaries into the
territory of another state.59
Some international legal authorities suggest that international law should oppose extraterritorial legislation. 60 The ter51. See generally id. at 156-57.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 157-59.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 145. For a thorough analysis of legislative jurisdiction, see Mann, supra
note 17, at 23-51; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).

56. Mann, supra note 17, at 13. Mann points out that: "Jurisdiction is concerned
with the State's right of regulation or, in the incomparably pithy language of Mr. Justice Holmes, with the right 'to apply the law to the acts of men.' " Id. (quoting Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573, 584 (1904)).
57. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 422.
58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 181. The problem has been explained as follows:
It has sometimes been suggested that all extraterritorial legislation is con-

trary to international law. In this connection a tag from Justinian's Digest is
often quoted: extra territorium ius dicenti impune non paretur. What this tag

means is that a man can disobey a judge with impunity outside the territory
over which the judge has jurisdiction. This is not the same as saying that the
judge (or the legislator) breaks international law if he asserts extraterritorial
jurisdiction; ineffectiveness is not the same as illegality. . . . The view that
extraterritorial legislation is invariably contrary to international law was rejected by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case.
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ritorial principle of legislation indicates that a state's legisla61
tion cannot regulate foreign citizens in a foreign country.
When such conduct injures the legislating state or its nationals,
however, the state may impose liability in certain instances.62
Thus, extraterritorial legislation is not always contrary to international law. 63 In fact, the Permanent Court of International
Justice in The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" 65 rejected the notion that
extraterritorial legislation is invariably opposed to international law.66 The court concluded that no rule of international
law prohibits a state in which the effects of an offense take
place from regarding the offense as having been committed in
its territory and from prosecuting the delinquent accordingly.6 Overwhelming state practice suggests that there are
"no rules of international law limiting the legislative jurisdiction of States in questions of what might be loosely described
as 'private law' (i.e. those areas of municipal law which are not
concerned with crimes, the functioning of public bodies or the
sovereign rights of the State)." '6 ' Although this assertion is

quite broad, there are certain limits to extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction advocated by international law. For example,
a state should not apply its law unless a close connection exists
between the state and the person, thing, or event to which the
law is to be applied. 69 A state's interest in the subject matter of
Id. at 181-82.
61. Mann, supra note 17, at 47. International law implies what one may call, a
requirement of noninterference in the affairs of foreign states. Id. In addition, this
noninterference requirement "renders unlawful such legislation as would have the
effect of regulating the conduct of foreigners in foreign countries. It is not normally
lawful for legislation to operate 'as applying to foreigners in respect of acts done by
them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting.' " Id.
62. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 179-81.
63. Id.
64. L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 7, 33.
65. (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
66. Id. at 20. In the Case of the S.S. "Lotus" the issue decided was whether Turkey
had acted in conflict with the principles of international law by instituting joint criminal proceedings in pursuance of Turkish law against a French officer, following the
collision on the high seas of the French steamer Lotus and the Turkish steamer, BozKourt. Id. at 18; see supra note 47.
67. 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 31.
68. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 187.
69. See Mann, supra note 15, at 46. Mann, a proponent of this viewpoint states
that:
[N]ot every close contact will be legally acceptable. The question whether
the contact is sufficiently close, though a question of degree, is answered,
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its legislation and whether this interest outweighs the concerns
of other states are factors deserving careful consideration
within an international context.70 International law will usually
allow a state to apply its own rule of law provided that the underlying policy of the rule would be served by its application.7 '
4. Comity
The doctrine of comity, 72 although not considered public
international law, 7 3 emphasizes many values recognized as significant by the international legal community. Among these
values are the use of local restraint and the limited application
of sovereign powers to extraterritorial events and persons.7 4
not by the idiosyncracies or the discretion of States or judges, but by the
objective standards of international law. All circumstances will have to be
taken into account, including, particularly, those to which the territorial doctrine attaches significance. These are in no sense to be discarded, but their
presence is not invariably necessary or sufficient to support international
jurisdiction . . . . In the final analysis, however, the question will be
whether international law . . . sanctions the exercise ofjurisdiction, special
regard being had to the practice of States and the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.
Id. at 46-47.
70. Id. at 48-51; see also DRATr RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 403(c) (stating
factors to be considered in limiting international jurisdiction).
71. Reese, supra note 55, 1608.
72. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 214-16. "Comity" was a term first used by the
Netherlands writers on private international law in the seventeenth century. They
used it to mean courtesy. Id. at 214. In most instances comity has been treated as
something different from international law. Id. at 215. Thus, the extradition of
criminals, in the absence of treaty is a matter of comity, not of right; exclusion of
foreign vessels from a port would be a breach of comity, but not of international law.
Id. Although comity is regarded as something more than courtesy, it is definitely not
synonymous with duty imposed by international law. Id. at 215-16.
73. Id. at 236. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), adopted a
comity analysis to the issue of whether United States law should be extraterritorially
applied. Id. at 601-14. A similar comity analysis has also been proposed in the American Law Institute's DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 403. Both analyses balance
the relevant interests of the United States and the foreign nation to determine
whether United States law should be applied. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-14;
DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 403.
74. Akehurst, supra note 26, at 214-15; see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at 31.
Brownlie notes that:
International comity, comitas gentium, is a species of accommodation not unrelated to morality but to be distinguished from it nevertheless. Neighbourliness, mutual respect, and the friendly waiver of technicalities are involved,
and the practice is exemplified by the exemption of diplomatic envoys from
customs duties. Oppenheim writes of the 'rules of politeness, convenience
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The value of comity should not be underestimated in assessing international jurisdiction. Comity stresses the notion
of reciprocal tolerance in international affairs.75 It requires
that the legal rights of other states and the decisions of courts
of other countries be respected as a matter of policy, not as a
matter of law.76 The international law goals of stability and
order are reinforced by this doctrine's emphasis on Lhe principle of self restraint, a principle that facilitates accommodation
rather than confrontation. 77 Comity imposes a figurative injunction upon states to act reasonably. With this in mind, a
great deal of emphasis is placed on balancing the relative interests of the states before asserting jurisdiction. This balancing
of interests approach was incorporated by section 403 of the
Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Draft Restatement) 7s and to a lesser extent by
section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
79
Law of the United States (Second Restatement).
and goodwill observed by States in their mutual intercourse without being
legally bound by them.' Particular rules of comity, maintained over a long
period, may develop into rules of customary law. Apart from the meaning
just explained, the term "comity" is used in four other ways: (1) as a synonym for international law; (2) as equivalent to private international law (conflict of laws); (3) as a policy basis for, and source of, particular rules of conflict of laws; and (4) as the reason for and source of a rule of international
law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
75. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 44-46.
76. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 296 (1982).

77. See Akehurst, supra note 26, at 216.
78. DRAFT

79.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 21, § 403.

note 17, § 40; see Houck, The New A.L.L Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States-Problemsfor Practitioners,in PRIVATE
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra

1983,
37 (1983). The Second Restatement has been described as "a treatise of very great
significance. U.S. courts quote it on matters of international law as if it were the
INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS IN

Bible .

. .

. The lack of a large body of case law in the international field . . . gives

this Restatement disproportionately greater influence." Id. at 39. With respect to
§ 40 of the Second Restatement, one authority writes that "the courts, after determining jurisdiction exists under the territorial or nationality principles, ,have resolved
concurrent jurisdiction by exercising 'voluntary restraint' when the regulatory interests of foreign nations having contact with the transaction or occurrence are great or
when those of the United States are minimal." Maier, supra note 76, at 295-96.
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B. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States
The Second Restatement distinguishes between two types
ofjurisdiction that may be exercised by a state: jurisdiction to
prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. 80 Jurisdiction to prescribe is the "capacity of a state under international law to
make a rule of law."'" Jurisdiction to enforce is the "capacity
of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law" by
the act of any branch of government.8 2 To enforce any legal
rule, both jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce
must be present. 8 3 It is contrary to international law either to
prescribe or enforce a rule without adequate jurisdiction.8 4
Consistent with the principles of public international
law,8 5 the jurisdictional rules set forth in the Second Restate86
ment are based primarily on nationality and territoriality.
Concerning nationality, section 30 of the Second Restatement
acknowledges that a state always has jurisdiction to regulate
the conduct of its own nationals wherever that conduct may
occur. 8v A state does not have jurisdiction over the conduct of
an alien outside its territory, however, merely on the ground
that the conduct affects one of its nationals. 88 Two distinct
doctrines are subsumed under the rubric of territoriality: 89 the
subjective territorial principle, or "conduct" doctrine, and the
objective territorial principle, or "effects" doctrine. 90
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

17, §§ 6-7.
Id.§ 6.
Id.
See id.§ 7.
Id.§ 8.
85. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at 15-20, 300-03.
86. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §§ 17-18.
87. Id.§ 30.
88. Id.§§ 17-18.
89. The doctrine of territoriality holds that a state has the power to control conduct occurring within its borders. A state has jurisdiction over persons, things, and
events within its territory. D. GRIEG, supra note 25, at 164. The classic formulation of
the territoriality principle which holds that a state may regard an offense as having
been committed in its national territory "if one of the constituent elements of the
offence, and more specially its effects, have taken place there," comes from the "Lotus"
Case. 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 23.
90. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect toCrime, 29
AM.J. INT'L L. 435, 484,487-88 (1935); see
also,Jennings, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
and
the United States Antitrust Laws, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 159 (commenting on the
conduct and effects test in an antitrust context).
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note
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Under the conduct doctrine, a state has subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases over anything located in its territory or
over the conduct of any person, including an alien, that occurs
within the state's territory.9 ' There are problems, however,
with the Second Restatement's adoption of this doctrine. The
term "conduct" as used in section 17(a) of the Second Restatement is so broad that it covers all territorial conduct.9 2 It defines extraterritorial jurisdiction expansively without including
'
workable limitations into the term "conduct." 93
Without any
further qualification of the term, a minimal degree of domestic
conduct could serve as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction
under section 17.
Under the effects doctrine, conduct abroad that produces
a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state is
considered within the subject matter jurisdiction of the state.94
The extraterritorial conduct and its effect must be constituent
elements of the proscribed activity.9 5 The only connection

with a territory required by section 18 of the Second Restatement is the presence of an effect, injury, or constituent element
of the offense.9 6 Conduct within the territory per se is not re91. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 17. Section 17 provides that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not suich consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. See id. § 17(a).
93. See id.
94. Id. § 18. Section 18 provides that: A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a
rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs
as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles ofjustice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id.
95. Id. "Constituent element" as used in § 18 implies an assertion of jurisdiction based on "attendant consequences or repercussions" resulting from the offense.
Id. Note that "effects" in § 18 is not confined to constituent elements of the offense.
See id.
96. Id.
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quired. 97 Consequently, the effects doctrine should be used
with caution lest liability be imposed for every impact within
the borders of a state.
Where states have concurrent jurisdiction to prescribe and
enforce rules of law for the same parties or the same facts, section 40 of the Second Restatement9 8 creates legal limitations
upon a state's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.9 9 Under
section 40, a rule of reason approach is advocated to decide
whether preexisting jurisdiction should be exercised. ° ° "Reasonableness" is determined by the forum's evaluation of the
states' relative interests and the fairness of enforcing the rules
in question.i °i The factors of international comity and fairness
97. Id.
98. Id. § 40. Section 40 provides that:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such
factors as
(a) vital national interest of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.
Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. The term "rule of reason" is applied here by analogy to the term of
art used in antitrust analysis.

P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

§§ 146, 203, 301

(1981). The rule of reason, which prohibited unreasonable conduct and unreasonable restraints of trade was first articulated in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). ChiefJustice White stated "the dread of enhancement of prices.

. .

which.

. .

would flow from undue limitation on competitive con-

ditions caused by contracts or other acts . . . led, as a matter of public policy, to the
prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." Id. at 58. Applying a "standard of reason" to determine whether an agreement is prohibited as a restraint of trade depends upon a
number of factors including the purpose of the arrangement, the character of the
parties and the effect of their actions. P. AREEDA, supra, § 203. These balancing factors in antitrust law, are mirrored in § 40 of the Second Restatement. Section 40
tries to determine by a "rule of reason" whether jurisdiction should be exercised.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 40. Reasonableness in the § 40 context is

determined by the forum's perception of the competing state's interest and fairness
to the parties. See id.
101. Maier, supra note 76, at 293-95, n.67.
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advocated in section 40 provide additional guidance to decisionmakers in resolving problems of extraterritoriiality. The
Draft Restatement also advocates this qualitative evaluation of
interests between regulating states and the parties or events to
be regulated.
C. Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States

The importance of the Draft Restatement,102 which includes a section entitled "Jurisdiction over Securities Transactions, "' 1 0 lies in its more equitable approach toward determining international jurisdiction. 0 4 This approach supplements
the territoriality and nationality tests of the Second Restatement with a balancing test that evaluates "all relevant factors."

0 5
1

These balancing factors help determine which state

has greater interest in deciding a matter. Among the considerations taken into account are whether the parties had legitimate expectations that certain results would flow from their
conduct and whether the jurisdictional rules invoked sufficiently notified the states of the obligations that a prescribing
state would enforce to vindicate its interests.' 0 6 Far from emphasizing narrowly nationalistic interests, these factors underscore the international law goals of stability, order, and pre102. DRA-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 21; Houck, supra note 79, at 47. "The
Draft Restatement describes a system for reducing collisons between legal systems by
reference to various balancing factors that help to determine which slate has greater
interest in regulating the matter, and [it] give[s] considerable weight to the reasonable expectation of the parties which the law would govern." Id. This balancing of
the interests of the parties is applied by analogy to the principles of conflicts of law.
Id. "It is an attempt to apply in the public law area the principles of conflicts of laws
that have long been applied in the public law area." Id.
103. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 416.
104. Id. § 403. The equity in the Draft Restatement's approach lies in the balancing of the relevant interests of the United States and the foreign nation concerned
to determine whether the United States should assert jurisdiction. Id.; see Maier, supra
note 76, at 300. The Draft Restatement "seeks to build on the instincive recognition
in these cases of a relationship between international law and wise national politics by
creating a coherent format for inquiry into jurisdictional problems so as to reflect
accurately the process by which the exercise of national power is legiiimatized in the
international community." Id. For this reason, "whether jurisdiction exists ab initio is
not determined by mechanical analysis of factual contacts but by judicial evaluation
of the propriety of the exercise of power." Id.
105. DRAF" RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 403 (2).
106. Id. § 403(2)(d), (f)-(h).
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dictability. 107
The Draft Restatement applies these same balancing factors to jurisdiction in securities transactions.10 8 Section 416
would permit the United States to prescribe its securities laws
over any transaction carried out on a United States securities
market.' ° 9 But, jurisdiction to prescribe depends upon reasonableness evaluated in light of the section 403 balancing factors
where:
(a) securities of the same issuer are traded on a securities
market in the United States; or
(b) representations are made or negotiations are conducted
in the United States in regard to the transactions; or
(c) the party subject to the regulation is a United States national or resident, or the persons sought to be protected are
residents of the United States . ...

to

107. For a summary of the goals of international law as perceived by the United

States, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). The Court emphasized the
functional role ofjudicial decision making in the international system. International
law "aims at stability and order through usages which considerations of comity, reciprocity and long-range interest have devleoped to define the domain which each
nation will claim as its own." Id. at 582.
108. DRAF-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 416. Section 416 provides that the
following factors should be taken into account in securities cases by incorporating
§ 403(2):
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state,
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id. § 403(2).
109. Id. § 416.
110. Id.
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Therefore, the factors for determining "reasonableness" in a
securities context include: the interests of a foreign state in
asserting jurisdiction; the expectations of the parties involved
that their conduct would be subject to the securities regulations of the United States; and, the interests of the state in regulating the conduct or effects of a fraudulent securities
scheme. 1"'
The Draft Restatement limits the broad extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws by rejecting the minimal
conduct approach, which recognizes a minimal degree of domestic conduct as a sufficient basis for exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. ' 1 2 The fact that the Draft Restatement rejects
this approach implies an unreasonable assertion of United
States jurisdiction."' Under the Draft Restatement, "conduct" would be only one factor among many to be evaluated in
assessing jurisdiction." 4 In keeping with the purpose of this
section of the Draft Restatement, which is to define the securities laws within the "limits of international law,""' 5 the minimal conduct approach would be rejected as a basis for asserting jurisdiction in extraterritorial securities cases.
The impact of the Draft Restatement on the effects test is
more difficult to assess. For jurisdiction to be predicated on a
domestic effect of extraterritorial conduct, the Second Restatement required that the effect be a direct and foreseeable result
of the conduct outside the territory and that the effect within
the territory be substantial." '6 Similarly, the Draft: Restatement, when listing relevant factors to consider in determining
whether jurisdiction is reasonable under section 403(2), states
7
that an effect must be direct, foreseeable, and substantial.ii
The difficulty in applying this test under both Restatements
lies in the fact that the term effects could be either broadly or
narrowly construed depending upon the meaning attributed to
111. Id. §§ 403,416.
112. See id. The list of balancing factors set forth in § 403(2) of 1-he Draft Restatement forces states to decide the question of extraterritorial application of United
States laws by considering relevant comity counsiderations as opposed to a mere
mechanical test of minimal conduct. Id. § 403(2).
113. See id.
114. Id. § 416 n.3.
115. Id. § 416 n.6.
116. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 18.
117. DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 403(2)(a).
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the qualifying adjectives. Unless the meaning of direct, foreseeable, and substantial is more clearly defined in light of the
interests of other nations as well as the demands of international order, the effects test runs the risk of being too relative
and amorphous to be useful.
II. EXTRA TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF RULE lOb-5 TO
OFFSHORE INVESTMENT FUNDS
In recent years, United States courts have extended the
extraterritorial reach of the corporate mismanagement application of Rule lOb-51 8 to the internal regulation" 9 of offshore
investment funds.' 20 This extension of Rule 1Ob-5 not only vi118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-b (1984); see supra note 10 (for the text of Rule lOb-5).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l, -64; id. § 80b-l, -21. Internal regulation refers to the
management of the corporate structure of the investment company. It includes the
management of routine activities of the investment company by its fiduciaries. Regulation also includes control over inter alia: breaches of fiduciary duty; affiliations of
directors; changes in investment policy; and, changes in board of directors. Id.
120. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977); IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Roth
v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969);
see also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 925-46 (1983). The situations involving corporate mismanagement applications of Rule lOb-5 typically involve activities where the controlling shareholders of a corporation induce the corporation to enter into a securities transaction from which they personally benefit. This
may occur, for example, when: 1) they issue themselves stock for an inadequate price;
2) approve a merger from which they stand to personally benefit; or 3) consolidate
their control through a redemption of securities by the corporation. In these situations, there are two corporate interests neither of which are served by the controlling
directors or dominant shareholders: i) the interest the corporation has in obtaining
reliable information in making its trading decisions; and ii) the interest of the corporation in being able to trust its directors with the management of its securities dealings. See generally id.; infra notes 168-297 and accompanying text.
There is a line of cases originating with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir.), revd with respect to holding on merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), which underscores this latter class of interests in the
Rule lOb-5 mismanagement context. In spite of the fact that the court in Schoenbaum
could not point to a specific act of actual deception, it found that once a minority
shareholder had controlling influence over the board's decision-making powers, the
fraud requirement would be met. See id. This test has been referred to as "new
fraud" given the novel approach to liability: liability is found for a pure breach of
fiduciary obligation. See Sherrad, FederalJudicial & Regulatory Response to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 698 n.19 (1978); Comment,
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L.

REV. 1103, 1103-04 (1969). Courts later interpreted Schoenbaum as holding that in a
corporate mismanagement context, no deception need be shown. In Marshel v. AFW
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but its application in

Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), the court allowed a cause of action based
upon a breach of fiduciary duty despite a finding of prior full and fair disclosure. Id.
The use of the "controlling influence" or "new fraud" test has been extremely
limited. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). In Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977), the Court limited this application of the
Rule by requiring that liability under Rule lOb-5 be based on deception and not on
breach of fiduciary duty alone. Id. at 473-74. The Court first took issue with the
Second Circuit's interpretation of Rule lOb-5. It reasoned that the statutory language of § 10(b) controlled the regulatory language of Rule 10b-5. Since "fraud"
does not appear in § 10(b), the Court called it a gloss on the language of the statute
and held that since § 10(b) gave no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any
conduct not involving manipulation or deception, a pure equitable fraud case was not
within the scope of § 10(b). Id. at 473. The plaintiff would have to either show manipulation or deception in order to come within the scope of Rule 10b-5. Id. The
Court stated that while a need for a federal fiduciary standard might esist, a judicial
extension of Rule lOb-5 is an improper servant for this cause. Id. at 479-80.
Although the Court, through Santa Fe, has virtually dealt a death blow 1:o the notion
that a corporate mismanagement suit may be brought under Rule lOb-5 without an
allegation of manipulation or deception, several lower court deci;ions led by
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978),
have narrowly construed Santa Fe. They hold that, with a proper allegation of deception, Santa Fe will not bar a corporate mismanagement action. See Healey v. Catalyst
Recovery, 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co.,
Inc. v. Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
820 (1980).
Ironically, judicial application of Rule lOb-5 to offshore funds occurs at a time
when the Supreme Court has been trying to reduce the scope of this Rule. For example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that proof of an actual purchase or sale of securities, rather than a lost
opportunity to purchase, is necessary to recover for a violation of Rule lOb-5. Id. at
754-55. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that
scienter, not mere negligence, is necessary to establish a Rule lOb-5 violation. Id. at
201. And, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Court held
that mere unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty, unsupported by allegations of deception or manipulation, is not actionable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 477-80; see also
Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum

Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977) (discussing the status of Rule lOb-5 after Schoenbaum).
121. Akehurst, supra note 26 at 214-17. Legislation is presumed to apply territorially unless a contrary Congressional intent is indicated. In a case where Congress
expressly provides that a statute applies to conduct outside the United States, a
court, according to Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), "would be bound to follow
the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process requirement of
the Fifth Amendment."

Id. at 1334. But see SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17,

§ 7(1) ("[a] state having jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law does not necessarily
have jurisdiction to enforce it in all cases"); id. § 30(2) ("[a] State does not have
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an
alien outside its territory merely on the gound that the conduct affects one of its
nationals"). The Second Restatement represents an awareness that when one nation
begins to extend its laws beyond its own boundaries, two principles of international
law come into conflict: i) that every state is sovereign and as such has exclusive control over acts occurring within its territory; and, ii) a state may impose penalties on
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122
this area ignores the basic purpose for which section 10(b)

and Rule 10b-5 were enacted. These regulations were enacted
to insure and protect the integrity of the marketplace and to
minimize market risk to potential investors by requiring full
disclosure. 1 23 While minority shareholders in offshore funds
deserve protection against inequitable treatment by their officers and directors, 2 4 overly broad constructions of Rule lOb5 resulting in extraterritorial extension of United States jurisdiction are an improper way to remedy
the corporate wrongs
25
of offshore investment companies.
persons who owe no allegiance to the state when their acts have detrimental effects
within the state. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); United States v.
Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). It seems proper
to limit the scope of the '34 Act to situations involving sufficient domestic acts. See
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[w]hen . . . a
court is confronted with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it
must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources
of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather
than leave the problem to foreign countries").
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982 & Supp.
1985). The statute states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security

. . .

not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or

contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
Id.
123. See infra notes 148-67 and accompanying text.
124. A fiduciary relationship exists between the officers and directors of the
fund and its shareholders. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 563-76 (5th ed.
1980). A fiduciary relationship creates a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with a client's undertaking. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1982
& Supp. 1985). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13, comment a
(1958); Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal CorporationLaw"" Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 181,
192, 196 (1966). The cornerstone of a fiduciary's duty is the obligation to act for the
client's benefit and to treat that client fairly. These standards are based on reasonable assumptions that reasonable persons would not entrust their property to fiduciaries unless their fiduciaries would act in conformity with certain standards. Fiduciaries are therefore expected to act for their client's benefit. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187-188 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 390 (1958).
125. Cf. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 2.2(410), 2.2(420) (1981); Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967); infra notes 148-67 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court has remarked upon the paucity of legislative history on § 10(b) in
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Courts have tried to identify the scope of liability under
the broadly stated prohibitions of section 10(b) and Rule lOb5.126 Liability is contingent upon proof that a person used a
manipulative or deceptive device involving a matertal misrepresentation or material omission in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.1 27 In making or facilitating the
transaction, the person must have acted with scienter beyond
mere negligence.' 28 The plaintiff must show reliance on a material deception or that a loss was at least causally related to
the deception.129 Liability under Rule lOb-5 can result either
from an affirmative misrepresentation or from the witholding
of information material to a decision whether to buy or sell a
security.' 31 In the case of offshore funds, Rule lOb-5 violations
usually derive from abuse of control' 3 ' and consist of either:
1) the defendant fund's knowing misrepresentation or omisErnst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "Neither the intended scope of
§ 10 (b) nor the reasons for the change in its operative language are revealed explicitly in the legislative history of the '34 Act, which deals primarily with olfher aspects of
the legislation." Id. at 202.
126. 3 L. Loss, supra note 120, at 820-944; see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). On the
elements needed to invoke Rule 10b-5 in a civil action, see J.V. PaIrick, Litigation
Under SEC Rule lOb-5 (ALI/ABA Publication 1975).

127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984); see United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17
(2d Cir. 1981); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31
(1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
128. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
129. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1102 (1983); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970).
130. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29
(D. Del. 1951).
131. It was precisely these "control" relationships which engendered the abuses
against which the ICA was targeted. Investment Company Act, §§ lOa-b, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-10(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985); id. § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17. The relationship
between the fund's directors, adviser, and shareholders is a "control" relationship. It
is the fund directors and advisers who really run the investment companies. In order
to effectively stay the abuses of control, the ICA limits insiders' participation in the
management of investment companies and drastically reduces their ability to deal
with the companies. Id. § 80a-17(e); see 2 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 585-603.
"Control" is defined in the ICA and the IAA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(9), 80b-2(17)
(1982 & Supp. 1985), in almost identical terms. The ICA defines "control" as follows:
"Control" means the power to exercise controlling influence over the man-
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sion of material facts to fund shareholders regarding investment decisions; or 2) the defendant fund's arrival at an investment decision based on prospective benefit to the directors or
3 2
fund managers rather than benefit to the shareholders.1
Either type of investment decision involves improper action by
the directors or fund managers and results in economic loss to
3
shareholders. 13
In the Rule lOb-5 corporate mismanagement cases dealing with offshore funds, the complaint is typically that an insider or controlling shareholder has caused the fund to execute a transaction that results in economic injury to the independent shareholder.134 Courts began to apply Rule lOb-5
to the corporate mismanagement of offshore funds because the
statutes that ordinarily cover abuses in investment companies,
the Investment Company Act of 1940' 3 1 (ICA) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940136 (IAA) (collectively, Investment
37
Acts), are not applicable to offshore funds.1
agement or policies of a company, unless such power is solely the result of
an official position with such company.
Any person who owns beneficially, either directly or through one or
more controlled companies, more than 25 per centum of the voting securities of a company shall be presumed to control such company. Any person
who does not so own more than 25 per centum of the voting securities of
any company shall be presumed not to control such company. A natural
person shall be presumed not to be a control person within the meaning of
this subchapter. Any such presumption may be rebutted by evidence, but
except as hereinafter provided, shall continue until a determination to the
contrary made by the Commission by order either on its own motion or on
application by an interested person.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(9) (1982 & Supp. 1985); see also, Note, The Mutual Fund Industry: A
Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 736, 799. (1969) (discussing management control

of the investment company).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b); id. §§ 80a-17(a)-(j); see 2 T.

FRANKEL

supra note 3, at

5-85; Note, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 L.Q.

REV.

472, 476

(1968).
133. Since a Rule 10b-5 action requires a causal connection between the deceptive misrepresentation or omission of material facts and the injury, the typical case
involves a plaintiff making an investment decision that leads to his loss. Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 845-50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
134. 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 125, §§ 4.7(b-41), 4.7 (000)(1);
L. Loss, supra note 120, at 926-28.
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -64 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
136. Id. §§ 80b-I to -21.
137. The Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of
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Congress enacted the ICA and the IAA to curb the scores
of abuses inherent in the structure of investment companies 38
and in the relationship between the investment company, its
1940 regulate only those companies that register under them or use the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to sell securities. Id. §§ 80a-7, -8, 80b-4. -6.; see also
SEC. EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE ORIGIN, SCOPE, AND CONDUCT OF THE INDUSTRY, NATURE, AND CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). See
generally 1-4 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3 (discussing abuses in investment companies).

Many provisions of the Investment Acts are intended to prevent or inhibit outright fraud. For example, § 17, the ICA's conflict of interest provision, contains important antifraud protections. The SEC is authorized to adopt rules to prevent
fraudulent and deceptive practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities held or intended to be acquired by an investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37,
-38. In addition, § 10 of the ICA places strict limitations on the composition of the
board of a registered investment company by requiring that no less than 40% of most
boards consist of persons who are not officers, directors, employees, or other "interested persons" of the investment company, its adviser, or its principal underwriter.
Id. § 80a-10. These restrictions help ensure that someone in a position of power will
serve as a "watchdog" on behalf of the shareholders, especially in situations involving possible conflicts of interest. See id. Similarly, § 206 of the IAA governs fraud in
the offering and rendering of investment advice. Under § 206 of the IAA, advisers
have a fiduciary duty toward their present and prospective clients to disclose all material facts in connection with the offer of their services. Id. § 80b-6, -3; see 2 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 348-52. "The language of the section [206] is sirailar to the
language of Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act . . . . However, section 206 deals with
duties of fiduciaries, whereas Rule 1Ob-5 deals with sale and purchase oF securities.
Fraud by unfair dealings may therefore be within the section." Id. at 352.
Furthermore the ICA contains two sections enacted to deal with investment
abuse: § 37 makes it unlawful to embezzle and commit larceny of invesl:ment company funds; and § 36 authorizes the SEC to bring an action for injuncti've relief on
the ground that the adviser, directors, and others have committed gross misconduct
and gross abuse of trust. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-35, -36.
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l(b)(l)-(8), 80b-7, -11; see I T. FRANKEL, supr2 note 3, at
30-33. "Temptations of the 1930s appeared in other forms in the 1960s. For example, there were attempts to form investment companies to invest in other investment
companies, arrangements that offer doubtful advantages to investors but may double
managers' fees. . . . The Hearings which preceded the 1940 Act revealed many of
these abuses." Id. at 30. The shareholders of the investment companies are the
risktakers in the mutual scheme. Regulation of investment companies strengthens
the shareholders' control over the companies' management and investment policies.
The ICA does this by converting pools of liquid assets into enterprises managed for
the benefit of their shareholders.
The Act regulates the safekeeping of investment company assets, makes larceny of assets a federal offense, prohibits or limits self-dealing between investment companies and their affiliates, regulates the capital structure of investment companies, and strengthens the control of investment companies'
shareholders over the management and over their companies' investment
policies.
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adviser, officers, and directors.' 39 These abuses include: self140
dealing, overreaching, and fraud.
Both domestic and offshore investment companies offer a
"special temptation to looters" because of their large pools of
liquid assets.' 4 ' The temptation exists to use these funds not
only for the benefit of investors but also for the benefit of managers and directors. 4 2 Many investment company transactions
reflect the conflicting interests between investment adviser, investment company, director, and shareholder transactions
characterized by the absence of 3arm's length dealing and by
4
opportunities for overreaching. 1
There are express statutory sections in the Investment
Acts that exclude foreign investment companies and foreign
investment advisers from the reach of both the ICA and the
IAA. 144 A foreign investment company or adviser must register under the Investment Acts or use the instrumentalities of
14 5
interstate commerce in order to be regulated by them.
Thus, the abuses covered by the Acts do not extend to offshore
funds. Consequently, United States courts have tried in recent
139. 1 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 30-33.
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, -10, -15; see 2 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 470; Note,
supra note 131, at 789, 802.
141. 1 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 29.
142. The Findings and Declaration of Policy in the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) illustrates that curbing such abuse is the primary intent of
the statute.
[I]t is declared that the national public interest and the interest of investors
are adversely affected . . .
(2) when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or their
portfolio securities are selected in the interest of directors, officers, investment advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons thereof, in the interest
of underwriters, brokers, or dealers, in the interest of special classes of their
security holders, or in the interest of other investment companies or persons engaged in other lines of business, rather than in the interest of all
classes of such companies' security holders;
id.
143. 2 T. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 371-643. "In 1940, Congress found that the
persons who managed investment companies had conflicting interests with the companies' interest and their shareholders, and that shareholders did not have sufficient
rights to elect the managements of their choice or to control them." Id. at 1; see 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-l(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6); Kapp, Role of Investment Company Directors, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,

INVESTMENT COMPANIES:

AN

INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION

1983, at 439-52.
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, -8, 80b-4 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
145. Id.
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years to extend Rule lOb-5' 46 extraterritorially in ordter to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in actions involving offshore
47
investment funds. 1
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
United States courts have found little guidance in either
the language or the legislative history of the '34 Act to help
them deal with securities cases involving primarily foreign action with a United States nexus.' 4 The legislative history
merely indicates that section 10(b) was primarily intended as
an antifraud catchall. ' 49 Among the Act's purposes is the prevention of inequitable practices on securities exchanges and
markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce. 50 In
146. See supra note 11 for a listing of cases reflecting this intent.
147. See supra note 120 for a listing of cases specifically involving offshore investment funds.
148. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). The Second Circuit in Bersch stated it was impossible to
accurately discern Congressional intent with regard to the extraterritorial scope of
Rule 10b-5. In House Report No. 1383, the purpose of the '34 Act was described as
an effort to protect the investing public by providing them with more adequate public
information. The House Report reads:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to
the value of the securities he buys and sells. The idea of a free and open
public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers
and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the
market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. . . .The disclosure
of information materially important to investors may not instantaneously be
reflected in the market value, but despite the intricacies of security values
truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the market. That is why in
many cases it is so carefully guarded ...
The reporting provisions of the proposed legislation are a very modest
begining to afford that long denied aid to the exchanges in the way of securing proper information for the investor . .

.

.Making these facts generally

available will be of material benefit and guidance to business as a whole.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1934); see Hearings on Stock Exchange
Regulation Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.

115 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Hearing].
149. Exchange Hearing,supra note 148, at 115.

150. 15 U.S.C. § 78e, j; see also United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd., 445 U.S. 22 (1980) ("[a] major purpose of the [securities law is]
to 'protect the integrity of the marketplace in which securities are traded' "). "The
core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should
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keeping with the spirit and the scope of this legislation, section
10 extends its proscriptions to fraudulent activity conducted by
"any person" employing, even indirectly, "any means or inIn
strumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails."''
this context, "interstate commerce" has been broadly defined
in section 3(a)(17) to include "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication. . . between any foreign country and
any State." 1 2 The main jurisdictional bases set forth in the '34
Act are: (i) use of the mails; (2) use of any instrumentality of
interstate commerce, e.g. the telephone, and, (3) use of a national exchange. 5 3 In order to confer statutory jurisdiction, it
is sufficient to show that someone was caused to use an instrumentality of interstate commerce 54 or that it might have been
reasonably foreseen that this would happen.155 Although both
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 contain similar language prohibiting fraudulent schemes that make use of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, neither provision delineates the jurisdictional scope of the '34 Act. In addition, the legislative history does not reveal congressional intent regarding the extraterritorial application of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' 5 6
In section 30 of the Exchange Act, Congress dealt with
applications of the '34 Act in an international context.' 5 7
Notwithstanding satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements
of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, some transactions are exbe subject to identical market risks." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982 & Supp. 1985). The scope of the Securities Exchange Bill of 1934, as reported in the House Report No. 1383, dated April 27, 1934,
includes abuses such as,
inadequate corporate reporting which keeps in ignorance of necessary factors for intelligent judgment . . . a public continually solicited to buy such
securities by the sheer advertising value of listing. They include exploitation of that ignorance by self-perpetuating managements in possession of
inside information. Speculation, manipulation, faulty credit control, investors' ignorance, and disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law
should disregard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web.
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, supra note 148, 5-6.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17).
153. Id. § 78e, f,j.
154. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
155. Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Gulf
Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 994-95 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
156. Exchange Hearings, supra note 148, at 115.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a)-(b).
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empted from the requirements of the '34 Act. Section 30 exempts "any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts

such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to
prevent the evasion of this chapter."' 58 Clearly, Congress intended section 30 to have extraterritorial application only 15in9
cases where the protection of domestic markets was at issue.
Determining whether offshore funds fall within the section
30 exemption depends upon the meaning assigned to the
phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United States. '"160 The
term jurisdiction could refer to either protective or territorial
jurisdiction.' 6 ' If jurisdiction refers to territorial jurisdiction,
then transactions occurring outside the confines of tlhe United
States will be exempt under section 30.162 If it refers to protective jurisdiction, then transactions of a predominantly foreign nature that effect national 1interests
would not be exempt
63
from United States jurisdiction.

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction and offshore funds
arises primarily in connection with the securities' held by these
funds in their portfolios.' 64 To the extent that their portfolios
consist of either United States securities or securities listed on
United States exchanges, portfolio transactions in these securities may be deemed transactions occurring in the United
States. 65 Whether this provides a sufficient contact with the
158. Id. § 78dd(a) (emphasis added).
159. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
6569, 6578-79 (1934).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd)(b); Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: ExtraterritoiialApplication
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 113 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 1225, 1226

(1972).
161. Note, supra note 160, at 1231-49.
162. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd)(b); Note, supra note 160, at 1231-49; supra text accompanying note 158 (for the text of § 30 of the '34 Act).
163. Note, supra note 160, at 1231-49. In order to determine if a transaction is
within the protective jurisdiction of the United States, "the question of whether an
act is substantial should be answered by reference to its potential for harm rather
than by reference to the significance of the act in the overall transaction." Id. at
1248.
164. Id. at 1249.
165. Id. at 1249-51. The question posed by this Note is whether an offshore
fund's activities as a dealer trading in securities of domestic companies on United
States exchanges, justify extending protective jurisdiction where they commit fraud.
Id. at 1250.
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United States to assert subject matter jurisdiction is a matter
that has been hotly debated in United States courts. 1 66 It is
within this context that United States case law treats subject
matter jurisdiction and the extraterritorial application of Rule

lOb-5. 167
IV. CASE LAW ANALYSIS
United States courts dealing with the application of Rule
lOb-5 to transnational transactions have decided these cases by
relying primarily on the conducts and effects tests set forth in
sections 17 and 18 of the Second Restatement.' 6 8 Both tests
result in a rigid determination of jurisdiction that ignores the
propriety of exercising jurisdictional power in an international
context. 69 The conduct test allows for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction where only a minimal degree of conduct
occurs in the United States.1 70 The justification for applying
this test to cases in which only a small amount of conduct occurs in the United States rests on the territorial principle of
international law.' 7 ' However, this test fails to define the
scope of conduct that comes within the jurisdictional reach of
courts, thereby allowing a broad range of acts to fall under the
rubric of minimal conduct. The effects test has an even greater
sweep than the conduct test. If extraterritorial jurisdiction is
to be measured by the effects of improper foreign transactions
on United States securities or United States securities markets,
the results could be devastating because an infinite number of
securities transactions come within the ambit of this test. Analysis of the case law on this topic assists in determining whether
the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction via Rule 1Ob-5 actions in fact regulates offshore investment companies under
the guise of protecting United States investors and the United
States securities markets.
166. See supra note 11.

167.
168.
tests).
169.
170.
171.

See infra notes 168-297 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-297 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement
See infra notes 172-297 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-252 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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A. Conduct Test
Legislation is presumed to apply territorially unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated. 7 2 In 1960, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York decided in Kook v.
Crang,1 73 that a United States court may assert subject matter
jurisdiction extraterritorially only where the illegal act occurs
within the United States. 74 Kook involved a United States resident who bought stock of a Canadian corporation on the Toronto Exchange from a Canadian broker. 7 5 The court held
that the transaction was a Canadian transaction "without the
jurisdiction of the United States."'' 7 6 The court also held the
1 77
transaction exempt under section 30(b) of the '24 Act,
notwithstanding the use made of the mails and telephones between the United States and Canada or the fact that the Canadian brokerage house had a New York office with which the
plaintiff made contact.17 8 It was alleged that the New York office of the Canadian brokerage house neither bought nor sold
securities for individual customers but was opened to deal directly with institutions and with members of the New York
Stock Exchange. 79 As such, this conduct was not sufficient to
bring the transaction within the legislative jurisdiction of the
'34 Act.' 8 0
The Kook court did not grapple with the issue of whether
United States conduct was sufficient to give the couriLjurisdiction. Rather, the main issue addressed was whether Congress
intended the '34 Act to be applicable to extraterritorial transactions."' The court explicitly stated that section 30(b) sup172. Mann, supra note 17, at 63. "It is a matter of universal experience that in

fact States do not ordinarily attempt to legislate in respect of matters outside their
jurisdiction. As a rule they legislate solely for the purpose of regulating their own
affairs .... " Id..
173. Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
174. Id. at 388-90.
175. Id. at 389.
176. Id. at 391.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd)(b).
178. Kook, 182 F. Supp. at 389.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 390-91. "Certainly, the mere presence of defendants as a broker or
dealer under Section 15 could not, without more, make its foreign transactions subject to the Act." Id. at 391.
181. Id. at 390.
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ports the presumption that legislation is territorial. 82 In arriving at this conclusion, the court applied a test that emphasized
the locus of the activities. "J]urisdiction," the court held, "as
used in Section 30(b) contemplates some necessary and substantial act within the United States . . . .Certainly, the mere
presence of defendant as a broker or dealer under Section 15
would not, without more, make its foreign transactions subject
to the Act."' 8 3 The United States conduct in Kook was not sufficiently substantial to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of the '34 Act. In subsequent cases, however, courts applied the '34 Act to foreign transactions based
on United States conduct that was not significantly more sub18 4
stantial than that in Kook.
Later cases have held that conduct within the United
States is a ground for applying Rule lOb-5 in transnational securities transactions. 185 Courts, however, have not regarded
the mere existence of some United States conduct as calling
for automatic extraterritorial application of the rule. 186 Unfortunately, Kook did not delimit the conduct sufficient to give
United States courts jurisdiction. 8 7 Thus, courts have expanded the scope of behavior that falls under the rubric of
conduct which is sufficient for extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In 1972, the Second Circuit in Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell,' found that a United States corporation
was defrauded by foreign defendants who had made material
misrepresentations in the United States regarding their company's securities. 189 Some material misrepresentations were
also made in England where the actual securities transaction
182. Id. "It is a canon of construction that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. . . .This construction is reinforced by the Act itself which, in Section
30(b), specifically restricts the Act to the transaction of business within the United
States." Id.
183. Id. at 390-91.
184. See infra notes 185-252 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g.,
SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th
Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1973);
Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Gulf International
Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
186. See infra notes 188-297 and accompanying text.
187. See Kook, 182 F. Supp. 388.
188. 468 F.2d 1326, 1327 (2d Cir. 1972).
189. Id. at 1336.
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occurred."' 0 The heart of the Leasco complaint was that defendants conspired to cause Leasco to buy stock of Pergamon
Press, Ltd., a British corporation controlled by Robert Maxwell, a British citizen, at prices in excess of its true value.' 9'
The first contact occurred in 1969 when Maxwell came to
Great Neck, New York, where Leasco then had its principal office. 19 2 There he proposed to Saul Steinberg, then Leasco's
Chairman, that Pergamon and Leasco engage in ajoint venture
in Europe.'
Within this time period, Maxwell made false representations to Steinberg and gave Steinberg the most recent
Pergamon annual report which contained materially false and
194
misleading statements about Pergamon's business affairs.
Noting that material misrepresentations occurred in the
United States, the court held that "if Congress had thought
about the point, it would.

. .

have wished to protect an Ameri-

can investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and
fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities
abroad."' 9 5
Leasco developed a test applicable to an extraterritorial
transaction in foreign securities traded exclusively in foreign
markets. The Second Circuit specifically declined to rely on
the effects test of jurisdiction, but instead chose to underscore
the conduct aspect of territoriality.' 9 6 The court found defendant's use of the mails and phones to be sufficient domestic
conduct to warrant assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction for
violations of Rule lOb-5.1 97 Regardless of whether i:he inducements were triggered by a phone call from London to New
York or by a conversation that took place exclusively in England, the court held that the conduct within the United States
was an essential link in luring Leasco into making the open
market purchases. 198
190. Id. at 1334.
191. Id. at 1330.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1330-31.
195. Id. at 1337.
196. Id. at 1334. "When no fraud has been practiced in this country and the
purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be hard pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1335. "[I]f defendants' fraudulent acts in the United States significantly whetted Leasco's interest in acquiring Pergamon shares, it would be immate-
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Leasco stretches the territoriality principle beyond the dictates of international law, which provides that rules relating to
jurisdiction ought to put citizens of other countries on notice
concerning the conduct within the United States that will subject them to liability under United States law.1 99 When, as in
Leasco, a minor degree of territorial conduct is responsible for
serious legal consequences, this strict conduct test is likely to
cause more international conflicts than it resolves.20 0
Leasco held that the language of section 10(b) is much too
inconclusive to lead anyone to believe that Congress meant to
impose rules throughout the world in every instance where an
American bought or sold a security. 20 ' Although the Court's
opinion ironically appears to advocate narrowing extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5, Leasco expanded the basis for
Rule lOb-5 liability by formulating a rule predicated on minimal conduct within the United States.20 2 Although Leasco involved only domestic plaintiffs, in 1975 the Second Circuit, in
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 203 affirmed Rule lOb-5 liability
predicated on conduct in the United States where the plaintiff
class included both United States citizens and foreigners.20 4
Bersch was a class action on behalf of thousands of residents of Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, Asia,
Africa, and South America. 20 5 The securities in question were
the common stock of defendant I.O.S., Ltd.20 6 I.O.S. was an
international sales and financial organization engaged primarily in selling and managing mutual funds and complementary
rial, from the standpoint of foreign relations law, that the damage resulted, not from
the contract ... procured in this country, but from interrelated action which he induced in England .... ." Id.
199. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
200. Maier, supra note 76, 317. "Unilateral attempts to balance national interests in transnational cases can result, at best, in a pale reflection of the true weight
and complexity of the competing interests involved." Id.
201. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334-35.
202. Id. In Leasco minimum domestic conduct such as the signing of a contract
in the United States is construed as significant. "Conduct within the territory alone
would seem sufficient from the standpoint of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule ....
And that contract, signed in the United States was an essential link in reducing Leasco
to make open-market purchases .... ." Id. at 1335.
203. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
204. Id. at 977-78.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 978.
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financial services.20 7 It was organized under the laws of Canada and had its main office in Geneva, Switzerland." °8 Bersch
charged, inter alia, that: 1) the underwriters impliedly represented to the public that I.O.S. was a suitable company for
public ownership when in fact the underwriters should have
known that it was not; and, 2) the prospectuses failed to reveal
illegal activities by I.O.S. and its officers that had seriously
damaged the company.20 9
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, concluded that the
federal securities laws did apply to sales of securities to United
States residents in the United States whether or not acts of material importance occurred in this country. 21 0 This holding effectively overruled the restrictive application of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.1 1 In addition, Bersch held that the securities laws
applied to United States residents abroad, but only if conduct
of material importance in the United States significantly contributed to plaintiff's losses.21 2 However, the Second Circuit
limited its exercise of jurisdiction by holding that the federal
securities laws did not apply to losses from sales of securities
to foreign citizens outside the United States where conduct in
the United States did not directly cause the losses.2 13 Foreign
purchasers were dismissed from the plaintiff class.2 4
The plaintiffs in Bersch, which included both United States
citizens and foreigners, alleged that with the assistance of
United States accountants and underwriters, I.O.S. planned
the offering and drafted part of the prospectus within the
United States.21 5 The court held that in determining whether
the activities that occurred within the United States were sufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction, the answer varied
depending upon whether the plaintiffs were foreign or United
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 978-81.
210. Id. at 974. "[T]he federal securities laws did apply to sales of securities to
American residents in the United States whether or not acts of material importance
occurred in this country." Id.
211. 182 F. Supp. at 388-90; see supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
212. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974.
213. Id. "The Court of Appeals . . . held that . . . the federal securities laws
did not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States
where acts in United States did not directly cause such losses." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 987.
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States citizens.2 16 In addition, the mere fact that activities had
occurred in the United States was not sufficient in itself to confer subject matter jurisdiction if the activities performed in the
United States were "merely preparatory" to the actual
fraud.2 1 7
Bersch rejected plaintiffs' argument that jurisdiction could
be based on the adverse economic impact on domestic securities markets resulting from the collapse of I.O.S.218 The court
concluded that subject matter jurisdiction lies only when fraud
results in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in
which the United States has an interest. 2 19 Subject matter jurisdiction does not lie where acts simply have an adverse effect
on the United States economy or on United States investors
generally.2 20
Bersch set forth a comprehensive test for the application of
the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act to extraterritorial transactions in foreign securities. The antifraud provisions:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident in the United States whether or not acts (or
culpable failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures

(3)

to act) of material importance in the United States
have significantly contributed thereto; but
Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) directly caused such losses.2 21

216. Id. at 992-93. "Whether Congress intended that such persons should be
entitled to obtain damages for violation of the securities laws is a different and closer
question .

. .

. We think the answer would be in the negative if none of the defend-

ants engaged in significant activities within the United States, as defendants.
Id.
217. Id. "While merely preparatory activities in the United States are not
enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located
abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident." Id.
218. Id. at 987-88.
219. Id. at 989. "This means to us that there is subject matter jurisdiction of
fraudulent acts relating to securities which are committed abroad only when these
result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United States
has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse effect on the American economy or American investors generally." Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 993.
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In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction ]ies under
the Bersch conduct test, courts evaluate the nationality of the
plaintiff and the type of conduct taking place in the United
States.2 2 Bersch attempted to redefine the application of Rule
lOb-5 in terms of citizenship, residence, and conduct by balancing concepts of territorial conduct and economic impact or
effect. The most important advance made in Bersch was the
court's rejection of a general effects test, one that would have
caused nearly every large security transaction to be :subsumed
under the Act.2 23
In 1980, the Second Circuit in HT v. Cornfeld,2 24 extended
Rule lOb-5 extraterritorially and asserted subject matter jurisdiction over foreign shareholders of a foreign investment company, while declining subject matter jurisdiction based on generalized effects on the United States economy.225 LIT was an
international investment trust, run like an open-ended mutual
fund. 2 26 It provided foreign fundholders with an investment
vehicle through which they could participate in a portfolio of
securities
chosen by its investment adviser, IIT Management
Co. 2 2 7 IIT brought a derivative action in the Unilied States
against its investment adviser, IIT Management Co., alleging
that IIT Management Co. had violated Rule lOb-5. 2 s In the
late 1960's, at the height of its prosperity, IIT held assets
worth U.S.$375 million, about forty percent of which were
United States securities. 22 ' The issue in Cornfeld was whether
United States courts had subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign investment adviser's scheme to defraud a foreign investment company. 230 Although this would have been a proper
222. Id. at 991-93.
223. Id. at 988. "[W]e conclude that the generalized effects described by Professor Mendelson would not be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over a
damage suit by a foreigner under the anti-fraud provisions of the securiLies laws." Id.
224. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
225. Id. at 917.
226. Id. at 909-13. An "open-end company" is defined as a company, "which is
offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer."
15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. 1985). The issuer has the obligation to pay
shareholders a proportionate share of the net assets of the fund which the shares
tendered for redemption represent. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1984); see also Note,
supra note 131, at 742-43 (defining open-end mutual fund).
227. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 913.
228. Id. at 912-14.
229. Id. at 913.
230. Id. at 912-16.
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subject for review under both the ICA and the IAA, this abuse
was left unregulated because the Investment Acts do not apply
to foreign investment companies. 2 3 ' Consequently, the court
asserted jurisdiction by a more circuitous means.
The court held that there was subject matter jurisdiction
through an extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5.23 2 This
determination was made by viewing the transaction as not entirely foreign and by straining to emphasize the domestic activities of the United States-based King companies, who were not
parties to the action. 23 3' The issuer's United States nationality
and the consummation of the fraudulent transactions in the
United States were factors that strongly guided the Second
Circuit toward applying the antifraud provisions of the '34
Act 2 34 and reversing the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The district court had viewed the
transaction as one having "its genesis abroad. . . with a group
of foreign managers of a foreign investment trust violating
what would appear to be their fiduciary duties to their
fundholders. ' 23 5 The district court believed that the foreign
managers were merely enlisting United States aiders and abettors 236
Cornfeld is a case where neither the alleged wrong nor its
substantial constituent elements occurred in the United States,
nor were they initiated here. The Second Circuit increased the
'34 Act's jurisdictional scope by subjecting to Rule lOb-5 liability foreign investment advisers that breach their fiduciary duty
to their clients.2 3 7 However, the extraterritorial application of
Rule lOb-5 to the fiduciary activities of foreign investment
funds (or, as in this case, investment trusts) is contrary to the
231. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, -8, 80b-4, -6.
232. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917-18.
233. Id. at 914.
234. Id. at 909. Judge Friendly stated that "the American nationality of the issuer and the consummation of the transactions in the United States were factors
pointing strongly toward applying the antifraud provisions of the United States securities laws." Id.
235. 1IT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
236. Id.
237. 1IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917-18. "I1T and its liquidators are complaining of deception practices on IIT by both the King complex, . . . and Management, whose acts were mainly outside [the United States] .

. .

. The ability of such a

victim to maintain such an action was decided in Goldberg, we see no reason to depart
from that decision .... ." Id. at 918.
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Congressional intent limiting such regulation to domestic investment companies by the IAA. 23 8
To use Rule lOb-5 in Cornfeld, the Second Circuit characterized the breach of fiduciary duty of the foreign investment
adviser as a material fact. 2 9 Failure to disclose a material fact

to a corporation's disinterested directors 240 or its investors
qualifies as one of the deceptive acts prohibited by Rule lOb5.241 The effect of using an expanded scope of the Rule in this
case permits United States courts to regulate the internal affairs of foreign investment companies.242 Under its corporate
mismanagement application, Rule lOb-5 subjects to scrutiny
and liability the questionable activities of an investment adviser
in connection with its duty toward the investment company
that it advises.
From the Second Circuit's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction based on the tenuous link between IIT Management
Co. and the King Corp.'s United States activities, it is just a
short step to the Eighth Circuit's holding in Continental Grain v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. 243 Continental Grain opened the courts to
foreign plaintiffs "where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within [the United S:ates]." 2 4 4
Plaintiff in ContinentalGrain was an Australian subsidiary of
a United States corporation.245 Continental purchased the
common stock of another Australian subsidiary :o obtain
"seedstock," a product that was produced under a licensing
238. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 148, at 11-13 wih 17 C.F.R.

§ 240.10b-5 (1984).
239. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917-19; see Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc.,
616 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1291-92 (9th Cir.
1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1978).
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (the ICA requires a certain percentage of the board
of directors to be independent, namely not "interested persons" as defined in
§ 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)).
241. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1984).; see supra note 226 and accompanying text.
242. The extended scope of Rule lOb-5 effectively regulates the fiduciary activities c-f
directors and investment advisers of offshore companies. Seegenerally Cornfeld,
619 F.2d 909.
243. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
244. Id. at 415 (quoting SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977)(emphasisadded).
245. Id. at 411.
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agreement with a United States corporation.2 4 6 The acquiring
company was not told that the selling company's primary asset,
the licensing agreement, could be reclaimed by the licensor
upon the expiration of the licensing agreement. 24 7 The Eighth
Circuit held that defendant's conduct was sufficient to provide
jurisdiction even though the ultimate effect of its conduct was
felt mainly in Australia.2 4 8 The fraudulent scheme of material
nondisclosure was devised and completed in the United States
24 9
and only then "exported to Australia.ContinentalGrain involved a securities transaction spanning
two continents where the sole victim was a foreign corporation. 250 The securities in question were not traded on any
United States exchange, nor did they have any measurable effect on domestic markets. 2 5' Relying on Bersch and Leasco, Continental Grain held that letters and telephone calls that
originated in the United States and were necessary to further
the fraud constituted domestic conduct "sufficiently" significant to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 5 2 Despite the
court's finding that domestic conduct was significant, the facts
point to the conclusion that a minimal amount of conduct is a
sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit.
B. Effects Test
Courts have held that in terms of the Second Restatement,
a finding that a United States effect was direct, substantial, and
foreseeable supports extraterritorial jurisdiction under Rule
lOb-5.2 5 3 The cases on point, however, do not clearly define
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 421. "The present case, however, involves a substantially foreign
transaction, [with] little if any domestic impact, and domestic conduct which consisted for the most part of use of the mail and telephone." Id. The court did not
explain how the fraud could be completed in the United States when all the negotiations and the closing were carried out in Australia.
249. Id. at 409.
250. Id. at 415.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 409. "Conduct alleged to establish a Rule lOb-5 violation, i.e., a
scheme of fraudulent nondisclosure devised in the United States by use of the mail
and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce, was conduct significant enough
to establish subject-matter jurisdiction." Id.
253. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a listing of such cases.
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the limits of the effects test.254
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook2 55 laid the foundation for the effects test when it stated that "Congress intended the Exchange
Act to have extraterritorial application in order. . . to protect
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities. 2 6 The plaintiff
in Schoenbaum alleged that an issue of stock in Canada to insiders of a Canadian company at an unfairly low price adversely
affected the value and price of the company's shares listed on
the American Stock Exchange, some of which were held by resident United States citizens, including the plaintiff.25 7
Although the foreign defendant's fraud was perpetrated on a
Canadian company and the foreign defendant never entered
the United States in connection with the fraud, the Second Circuit found that because the company's stock was registered
and traded on the American Stock Exchange, an adverse effect
on the equity of United States shareholders was sufficient to
25 8
support jurisdiction.
The problems with the Schoenbaum decision are easily recognizable. First, although section 18(b) of the Second Restatement limits the effects doctrine to "substantial and foreseeable" effects of conduct in the United States, 259 the plaintiffs in
Schoenbaum exceed these limits by neither claiming nor proving
dilution in the value of their stock as a basis for jurisdiction. 26
The plaintiffs brought a derivative suit on behalf of the Canadian company to recover losses caused by the sale of treasury
stock at what they considered an unfairly low price. 61 Since
most publicly owned companies are likely to have United
States shareholders,2 6 2 an expansive interpretation of
254. See infra notes 255-297 and accompanying text.
255. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
256. Id. at 206.
257. Id. at 204.
258. Id. at 206.
259. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 18(b).
260. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204-08.
261. Id. at 200-04.
262. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK OF 1984, at 4, 54 (1984) (statistical
portrait of the Exchange Community in 1983). At year-end 1983, shares listed on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) totaled 45.1 billion with a record 42.36 million
United States shareholders. Id. An additional 133 million individuals owned stock
directly through such assets as pension plans, mutual savings bank accounts and life
insurance policies. Id. at 57. Major institutional investors held approximately 35.4%

440 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:396
Schoenbaum would bring securities transactions throughout the
world within the ambit of Rule lOb-5. This decision does not
clearly define the limits of the effects test. The omission gives
other courts the option of extending Rule 1Ob-5 jurisdiction to
an unacceptably wide scope.2 63 It leaves open the question
whether the "direct and foreseeable" conduct requirement in
the Second Restatement may be waived in all circumstances or
only in situations where stock is registered on a domestic exchange.264
An even more disturbing aspect of Schoenbaum is its holding regarding federal standards of conduct in Rule lOb-5 corn the
h line of cases repreporate mismanagement cases. 261 In
senting the corporate mismanagement aspect of Rule lOb-5 actions, Schoenbaum sets a "new fraud" standard,2 6 6 which bases
liability on a finding of controlling influence to induce an injurious securities transaction in cases that involve a failure to disclose.2 6 7 If plaintiffs demonstrate that: 1) the defendants had
exerted controlling influence over the corporation in inducing
the transaction, and 2) the transaction was unfair to the corporation, this would be sufficient to prove that defendant's conduct was either an, "act, practice, or course of business which
operates. . . as a fraud" within the meaning of Rule lOb-5. 68
As an entirely independent basis for liability, the Court also
held that the directors had deceived the plaintiff company's
shareholders.269 The implications of this new fraud standard
for extraterritorial jurisdiction in 1Ob-5 actions are significant.
of all NYSE stock. For a comparison of the lesser activity engaged in on foreign
exchanges, see id. at 68.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 147-66.
264. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206-08.
265. Id. at 219-20. The plaintiffs in Schoenbaum alleged that Aquitaine exercised
a "controlling influence" over the decision to issue stock. Id. at 219. The court held
that if Aquitaine had exercised such control, it would be a violation of Rule lOb-5(3),
because the transaction would operate as a fraud. Id. at 219-20; see supra note 120
and accompanying text.
266. See, Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal
CorporationLaw, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1108 n.33 (1969).

267. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 219-20. "In the present case it is alleged that Aquitaine exercised a controlling influence over the issuance to it of treasury stock of
Banff for a wholly inadequate consideration." Id. at 219.
268. Id. 219-20.
269. Id. If it is established that the transaction took place as alleged it constituted a violation of Rule lOb-5, subdivision (3) because Aquitaine engaged in an "act,
practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
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Although deception need not be shown to invoke this standard, a showing of controlling influence by offshore fund directors or advisers exerted in connection with a transaction
that is unfair to the corporation would be a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction. 2 70 This standard would make virtually all control
persons in an offshore fund context suspect and amenable to
271
Rule lOb-5 liability.
Schoenbaum was immediately seen as the advent of a new
federal standard to regulate the behavior of corporate insiders
in handling their corporate securities transactions. 2 7 2 Since
1969, when Schoenbaum was handed down, many decisions including Popkin v. Bishop,273 Santa Fe v. Green,2 7 4 and Goldberg v.
Meridor27 5 have limited and qualified its holding concerning
corporate mismanagement standards under Rule 1.0b-5.2 76
Nevertheless, after Schoenbaum, the use of controlling influence
to destroy arm's length business dealings between the corporation and its directors continues to be open to Rule lOb-5 liability. 2 77 Therefore, it remains an important unsettled issue
whether a federal interest exists in applying the Rule extraterritorially to maintain a climate of fair dealing by preventing the
kinds of fraud and manipulation to which a corporation is
uniquely susceptible in an international context.2 7 8
In 1975, the Second Circuit in HIT v. Vencap,2 79 limited the
280
extraterritorial application of the conduct and effects test.
Decided on the same day as Bersch, Vencap involved the liquidators of IIT, an investment trust organized in Luxembourg
... .Moreover, Aquitaine and the directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the
stockholders of Banff (other than Aquitaine)." Id.
270. Id.
271. The "controlling influence" test set forth in Schoenbaum has a very broad
sweep. Since deception need not be proven, the controlling influence Icest creates
pure liability for a breach of fiduciary obligations under Rule 1Ob-5. Id.
272. Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement
Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1033 (1973).
273. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
274. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
275. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
276. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474-76; Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 217-21; Popkin, 464 F.2d
at 718-21; see Note, Securities Regulation - Liabilityfor CorporateMismanagement Under Rule
lOb-5 After Santa Fe v. Green, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 269 (1980).
277. Note, supra note 276, at 279.
278. Id.
279. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
280. Id. at 1012-16.
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which sued Vencap, a Bahamian venture capital firm 281 in
which IIT had become a preferred shareholder.2 8 2 The
purchase and sale was negotiated in the Bahamas, and the
agreement was drafted in New York by United States lawyers
for IIT and Vencap. 83 Once IIT's money was invested and the
agreements concluded, Richard Pistell, a United States citizen
who was chairman and president of Vencap, caused the company to enter into business deals that led to the conversion of
substantial amounts of Vencap's assets to Pistell's personal
use. 2 84 In effect, IIT hired Pistell as a money manager who
would receive, in addition to liberal compensation, two-thirds
of the profit after six percent interest, the latter payable to preferred shareholders only if earned.2 8 5 Although Pistell represented that Vencap would be operated solely as a bona fide
venture capital enterprise, it was in fact to be used, in substantial part, for Pistell's private use. 8 6 Plaintiffs tried to argue
that since there were United States fundholders of IIT, Pistell's
foreign activities could have had a significant United States effect.2 8 7 Judge Friendly admitted that this would be a possible
argument if there were complicity by IIT's management in the
fraud.2 8 8 This theory was nevertheless rejected since less than
one percent of IIT fundholders were United States citizens living in the United States, and because IIT had not intended to
offer its shares to United States residents or citizens. 89
The Second Restatement's requirement that the effect
281. Venture capital is defined as being "[c]apital to provide for start-up situations ("seed capital") and for the existing high-risk small businesses suffering from
capital deficiencies but having high profit potential as of high technology." G. MUNN,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE

(8th ed. 1983).

282. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1003-07.
283. Id. at 1004-06
284. Id. at 1013.
285. Id. at 1012.
286. Id. at 1013.
287. Id. at 1016.
288. Id. at 1016-17. "Even on some of the theories listed above which assume
complicity by lIT's management, the action would be a derivative one on lIT's behalf. The American residence or citizenship of certain fundholders would thus become important only on a theory akin to that of piercing the corporate veil." Id.
289. Id. Although 1IT's prospectus stated that shares were neither offered for
sale nor sold to United States citizens or United States residents, the Judge found
that "approximately 300 United States citizens and residents are fundholders in IT."
Id.
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within the United States be substantial 290 clearly could not be
satisfied. 29t The only United States activity during this period
was the drafting of the agreement formalizing a deal worked
out in the Bahamas.292 The court held that these activities
were merely preparatory in the Bersch sense and could not
alone support a Rule lOb-5 suit. 29 3 The court did find a basis,
however, for asserting subject matter jurisdiction in the fraudulent transactions, in which Pistell was engaged from the offices of his New York lawyers.294 Judge Friendly indicated that
fraudulent acts for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction are
those that are elements of a substantive Rule l0b-5 violation.2 95 The court viewed Pistell's New York activities as misrepresentations evidencing either Pistell's fraudulent intention
or as acts that consummated the fraud.2 9 6 Thus, where the
United States is used as a base for manufacturing fiaudulent
security devices7 for export, the court of appeals foundcjurisdic29
tion to exist.

C. Analysis

Although section 30(b) of the '34 Act expressly exempts
transactions conducted "without the jurisdiction of the United
States," courts have recognized the need to apply Rule lOb-5
extraterritorially in order to: 1) protect domestic investors
290. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 18.
291. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018.
292. Id.
293. Id. "Our ruling on this basis ofjurisdiction is limited to the perpetration of
fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to mere preparatory activities or the
failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in
foreign countries, such as in Bersch." Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. Acts initiating, directing, and consummating the mailing of literally
hundreds of pieces of mail to and from Vencap's 99 Park Avenue office, where all
transaction records were maintained, could "be regarded substantively as the acts
that consummated the fraud." Id.
296. Id. at 1017-18.
297. Id. at 1017.
We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as
a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when
these are peddled only to foreigners. This country would surely look
askance if one of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured into the United States. By the same token it
is hard to believe Congress meant to prohibit the SEC from policing similar
activities within this country.
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who have purchased foreign securities on domestic exchanges;
and 2) protect the domestic securities markets from the effects
29 8
of improper foreign transactions in United States securities.
Guided by the principles embodied in sections 17 and 18 of
the Second Restatement, 99 courts initially applied the strict
territoriality principle and required that the illegal act occur
within the United States.3 0 0 Gradually, the court's focus
shifted away from a strict conduct test to an analysis of effects.
Under this test, the illegal act did not have to occur in the
United States as long as conduct abroad produced domestic
harm 30 ' and defendant accomplished other related acts within
the United States that significantly affected domestic markets.3 °z The extent of the domestic harm and the degree of
additional related conduct needed to invoke the statute has
been hotly debated and litigated.30 3
What emerges from this background is a series of cases
struggling to define the '34 Act's extraterritorial reach. Judicial interpretations of Rule lOb-5 have led to its extraterritorial
application to offshore funds based primarily on broad constructions of the Second Restatement's conduct and effects
4
test.

30

Ironically, the use of the Second Restatement to justify the
extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5 to situations involving corporate mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty occurs at a time when the Supreme Court has repeatedly attempted to limit the application of the Rule in domestic corporate mismanagement situations.30 5
The corporate
298. See supra notes 127-67 and accompanying text.
299. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 117, §§ 17-18.
300. Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
301. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1972).
302. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respect to holding on merits,

405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
303. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987-90 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
304. See supra notes 79-297 and accompanying text.
305. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); IIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1980); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616
F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980);
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 210-16 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
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mismanagement aspect of Rule lOb-5 effectively regulates offshore investment funds by subjecting business and investment
decisions of directors and advisers of these funds to a "mythical American fiduciary" standard." 6 This far exceeds the legislative intent of section 10(b).3"7 Nothing in the legislative
history of section 10(b) expresses Congressional intent to regulate transactions that constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement.3 0 8 In addition, this application of United
States securities laws to offshore funds is far from consistent
with international law.3 0 9 Under international law, a state
should not without good reason apply its law in disregard of
the substantial interests of another state.31 0 In the cases dealing with the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5, there
has been a paucity of information relating to the concerns of
offshore funds. The broad extraterritorial application of Rule
lOb-5 is little more than a minimum conduct approach, that is,
a rigid approach to jurisdiction that often upsets the justified
expectations of the foreign parties and thereby ignores the demands of international law.3 1
What is needed in determining international jurisdiction
in securities cases is an approach similar to that proposed in
sections 413 and 416 of the Draft Restatement, 31 2 or an approach that calls for weighing the relative state interests with
special sensitivity to the "reasonableness" of enforcing the
(1978); see Note, Causation in Rule lOb-5 Actions for Corporate Mismanagement, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 936 (1981).

306. See 17 C.F.R. 240.lOb-5 (1984). The argument can be made that Rule lOb5 is operating in corporate mismanagement cases as a substitute for a nonexistent
federal fiduciary standard and not as a disclosure statute. It has been suggested that
a federal fiduciary standard should be incorporated as part of the securities laws of
the United States and that the increasing number of mismanagement cases heard
under the guise of nondisclosure suggests a need for such a standard. Cary, A Proposed FederalCorporate Minimum StandardsAct, 29 Bus. LAw. 1101 (1974); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Jennings,
Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAw. 991 (1976).

307. See supra notes 118-67 and accompanying text.
308. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 148, at 5-13; Exchange Hearings, supra

note 148, at 115.
309. See supra notes 16-117 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 55-101 and accompanying text.
311. Mann, supra note 17, at 46-48; see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at 31; Maier,
supra note 76, at 293-95 n.67.
312.

DRAFr

RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, §§ 413, 416; see supra notes 102-17 and

accompanying text.

446 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL
rules in question. As the mobility of the world's capital markets increases, the political importance of avoiding international confrontation in an increasingly interdependent international environment cannot be overemphasized. 31 3 United
States courts need to focus on a jurisdictional test that will facilitate transnational commercial interaction.
Considerations of international comity and reciprocity, as characterized
by judicial restraint in exercising jurisdiction, should be the
rule.31 5 Absent guidance from legislative history on the topic
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and Rule lOb-5, courts should
look to the general principles of international law to guide the
prudent exercise of national power in the international com3 16
munity.
CONCLUSION
By asserting jurisdiction extraterritorially to offshore
funds in corporate mismanagement situations, the courts in effect use Rule 1Ob-5 to regulate the internal affairs of offshore
investment funds. This internal regulation is an impermissible
intrusion which is not substantiated by the legislative history of
the '34 Act and which violates the principles of comity and reciprocity of international law.
Franca A. Franz
313. Thomas, Internationalization of the World's Capital Markets-Can the SEC Help
Shape the Future, supra note 11, at 83-85.
314. Thomas, Extraterritorialityin an Era of Internationalizationof the Securities Markets: The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, supra note 11, at 454.
315. Maier, supra note 76, at 306-11; Mann, supra note 17, at 36-51; see Akehurst,
supra note 26, at 212-40.
316. Maier, supra note 76, at 319. "Any judicial decision that fails to consider
the needs of the international system in light of shared community values must necessarily fall short of achieving an effective coordination of national laws and concurrent
national claims to jurisdictional power." Id.

